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other valuable securities, has become a recognized branch of
commercial jurisprudence; and as such transactions are not
confined to a single locality, but extend throughout the civilized
world, uniformity of decision is a matter of great public convenience and universal necessity.
Stern and inflexible rules are necessary to give full confidence to those who deal in such securities, so that if such an
instrument be made without consideration, or have any other
infirmity, the holder taking without knowledge of such facts
will be protected.
And about all that is necessary to bring about such a result is
the concurrence of a few more of the State Courts, and especially the Courts of Pennsylvania and New York.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COMMONWEALTH v. McMANUS.
SYLLABUS.

The defendant was tried for murder.
Held, per MITcHnrL, J.: That the jury are not judges of the law in any
case, civil or criminal.
The determination of the law is no part of their duty or their right.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Appeal from the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia
County.
On a trial for murder in the first degree, the counsel for the
prisoner asked the Judge to charge: "The jury are judges of
the law as well as of the facts, and may, upon the whole case,
determine the grade of the offence."
The Judge answered this point by saying, "that the jury had
been sworn to decide the case on the law and evidence; that
the statement of the law by the Court was the best evidence of
the law within the jury's reach, and that, therefore, in view of
that evidence, and viewing it merely as evidence only, the jury
was to be guided by what the Court had said with reference to
the law."
The Supreme Court affirmed this answer of the learned
Judge as " an accurate and carefully considered answer to the
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point, and in entire harmony with Kane v. the Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 522." Per PAxsoN, C. J. Opinion filed, June
5, 18gi.
J., filed October 5, i89I.
Concurring opinion by MIrrcHnu,
I concur in affirming this judgment and in the reasons
given; but upon one point I would go further, and put an end,
once for all, to a doctrine that I regard as unsound in every
point of view, historical, logical or technical. The prisoner at
the trial requested the Judge to charge the jury that they were
The learned
"judges of the law as well as of the facts."
Judge, feeling himself bound by the language of Kane v. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 522, answered that the jury had been sworn
to decide the case on the law and the evidence; that the statement of the law by the Court was the best evidence of the law
within the jury's reach, and that, therefore, in view of that evidence, and viewing it as evidence only, the jury was to be
guided by what the Court had said with reference to the law.
The point should, in my opinion, have been answered with an
unqualified negative. The jury are not judges of the law in
any case, civil or criminal. Neither at common law nor under
the Constitution of Pennsylvania is the determination of the
law any part of their duty or their right. The notion is of
modern growth, and arises undoubtedly from a perversion of
the history and results of the celebrated contest over the right
to return a general verdict-especially in cases of libel-which
ended in Fox's Bill, 32 Geo. 3 C. 6o.
In the early days of jury trials, issues that went to the
country were usually simple and were probably submitted to
the jury without much separation of law and fact by the Judge,
and in that sense juries decided the law. But the distinction
between questions of law and fact and the tribunals for their
decision respectively lies at the foundation of our judicial
system, and there was no time when it did not exist. The
rule of questionem facti non resfiondent judices, ad questionem
juris non reshondentjuratores, was an ancient maxim in the
days of Coke (Coke Litt. 155 a; 8 Rep. 155 a; 9 Rep. 13 a);
and Mr. Bigelow, treating of the class of cases raising
questions of law, or some question of fact properly belonging to the Court to decide, quotes the case of the Archbishop, of Canterbury v. Abbot of Ba/tel Abbey, i Rotul 143,
tempore Stephen, which "turned upon a question of law, and
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was decided (without appointment of a trial term) just as a
modem case of the kind would be decided, by a submission of
the point of law in the question to the determination of the
Court, and not to some test imposed by the parties: " Hist.
of Procedure in Rngland during the Norman Period, by M. M.
Bigelow, p. 286. Nor was there any distinction in respect to
the merely incidental way in which juries passed upon matters
of law between civil and criminal cases. They might return
a general or a special verdict in either, but they early sought
to escape the obligation of giving a general verdict, because
it subjected them to the risk of an attaint ; and Coke says,
"Some Justices did rule over the recognitors to give a precise
or direct verdict without finding the special matter:" 2 Inst.
422.
To relieve juries from the burden, the Statute of Westminster, 2 C. 30, enacted, " Quod Jusliciariiad assisas capiend
assigna/i,non compellanijuratoresdicere praecisesi sit disseisina
vel non, dummodo dicere volunerint verilatemfacti, elpetere auxilium Iuslic;" and commenting upon this section, Coke says,
" In the end it has been resolved that in all actions, real, personal and mixed, and upon all issues joined, general or special,
the jury might find the matter of fact pertinent,
.
.
and
thereupon pray the discretion of the Court for the law; and
this the jurors might do at the common law, not only in cases
between party and party, whereof this Act putteth an example
of the Assise, but also in pleas of the Crown: " 2 Inst. 425.
It is a striking illustration of the uniformity of human motives
at all periods that, while the attaint remained as a remedy for
perversity or favoritism, the struggle of juries was to escape
the obligation of general verdicts, and to maintain the right of
special findings of fact; but when the decline and final disuse
of the attaint rendered them practically irresponsible, the
struggle was reversed, and juries asserted stoutly the right to
give general verdicts, while the tendency of lawyers and Judges
was to confine them to special findings of fact, and to have the
Court pronounce the result as a matter of law. The period of
transition was long, and changes slow. It was clearly and
justly felt that juries, as judges of the law, in any but an incidental way, were an anomaly in the system, and perhaps those
who endeavored to do away with it claimed too much. Safety
was thought to reside in the retention by juries of the right to
give general verdicts. In view of the constant and notorious
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failure of justice in certain classes of cases, by the occasional
perversity and the frequent cowardice of juries, it may be
doubted whether it would not have produced better results to
have enlarged the power of Judges to compel special verdicts; but
however this may be, the right of juries to give general verdicts,
especially in criminal cases, has been maintained, and the last
contest made on it was in regard to libel. The exact line between law and fact, not always easy to draw, presented in the
case of libel some special difficulties, technical and other. The
alleged libel being in writing, its terms were not in dispute,
and naturally fell to the Court to pass upon, as other writings
did; and the intent, libellous or otherwise, being claimed as a
legal inference, there was nothing left in dispute but the fact of
publication and the truth of the innuendo. Accordingly, the
juries in the Dean of St. Asoph's case, and the King v. Withers,
3 Tern. Rep. 428, were confined to these two points; and it was
to counteract these rulings of Buller and Mansfield and Kenypn
(though it cannot be disputed that they were in accordance
with long-settled practice), and to secure in libel, as in other
cases, the right of the jury to find a general verdict upon the
whole matter in issue, that the Act of 32 Geo. 3 C. 6o was
passed. The text of that famous statute is worth quoting, to
'show how little foundation it affords for the superstructure
that is sought to be built upon it. It is entitled "An Act to
remove Doubts respecting the Functions of Juries in Cases of
Libel," and its language is: "Whereas, doubts have arisen
whether, on the trial of an indictment . . . . for the
making or publishing any libel where an issue is joined
*on the plea of not guilty pleaded, it be competent to the
. ,*
jury impanelled to try the same to give their verdict upon the
whole matter in issue. Be it therefore declared . . ..
that, on every such trial, the jury sworn to try the issue may
give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the
whole matter put in issue upon such indictment or information, and shall not be required or directed by the Court or Judge
before whom such indictment or information shall be tried to
find the defendant or defendants guilty, merely on the proof of
the publication by such defendant or defendants of the paper
charged to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in
such indictment or information.
" Provided, always, that, on every such trial, the Court or
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Judge before whom such indictment or information shall be
tried shall, according to their or his discretion, give their or
his opinion and discretion to the jur- on the matter in issue
between the king and the defendant or defendants, in like
manner as in other criminal cases.
"Provided, also, that nothing herein contained shall extend,
or be construed to extend, to prevent the jury from finding a
special verdict in their discretion, as in other criminal cases.
"Provided, also, that in case thejury shall find the defendant
or defendants guilty, it shall and may be lawful for the said
defendant or defendants to move in arrest of judgment, on
such grounds and in such manner as by law he or they might
have done before the passing of this act; anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding."
Nothing could be clearer than the care with which this act
was directed to the exact point in controversy-the right to
render a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole
issue in case of libel-and the equal care with which the right
of the Court to pass finally upon the questions of law was
preserved by the provisos, that the Judge should give the jury
his "opinion and directions," and that averdict should still not
be conclusive of the law against a defendant, but he should
have his right to an arrest of judgment as theretofore enjoyed. The claim that juries were to be judges of the law
was thus intentionally and carefully excluded.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania was made in 1790, two
years before Fox's Libel Act. The controversy was then at its
height, and the subject commanded popular attention. In fact,
Pennsylvania had borne rather a distinguished part in the discussion, and the speech of &ndrew Hamilton, in the trial of
John Peter Zenger, was regarded as the vindication of popular
rights, and not only quoted as such by Erskine, but referred
to, among other authorities, by Hargrave: Coke Litt. 155 b.
"No lawyer," says Mr. Binney, "can read that argument without preceiving that, while it was a spirited and vigorous though
rather overbearing harangue, which carried the jury away from
the instruction of the Court, and from the established law of
both the colony and the mother country, he argued elaborately
what was not law anywhere, with the same confidence as he
did the better points of his case. It is, however, worth remembering, and to his honor, that he was half a century before Mr. Ers-
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kine, and the Declaratory Act of Mr. Fox, in asserting the right of
the jury to give a general verdict in libel as much as in murder:"
Leaders of the Old Bar of Philadelphia, p. 15. The members
of our convention of 1790 were familiar with the subject, and
the minutes show that much care was given to framing the
clause in the Declaration of Rights which refers to it. Section
7 of the Article 9, relating to liberty of the press, was originally
reported to the convention by the committee, to draft a proposed constitution, on December 21, 1.789, in the following form:
"That the printing presses shall be free to every person who
undertakes to examine the proceedings of the Legislature, or
any branch of government, and no law shallbe ever made restraining the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts
and opinions is one of the most invaluable rights of man, and
every citizen may freely speak, write and print, being responProceedings of the Consible for the abuse of that liberty:"
This was reported from
vention, 162 (Harrisburg, 1825).
Committee of the Whole, on February 5, 1790, in the same
form (dropping only the word "most" before the word "invaluable" ), but with the addition "but upon indictments for
the publication of papers investigating the conduct of individuals in their public capacity, or of those applying or canvassing
for office, the truth of the facts may be -given in evidence in
justification upon the general issue:" Id. 174. On February
22, this section being under consideration, Mr. Addison offered
as a substitute for the sentence last quoted: "In prosecutions
for libels their truth or design may be given in evidence on the
general issue, and their nature and tendency, whether for public information or only for public ridicule or malice, be determinded by the jury." To this an amendment, offered by Mr.
McKean, to add "under the direction of the Court, as in other
cases," was adopted almost unanimously, the vote being 56 to 3;
but the substitute itself received a bare majority, 32 to 27, the
strong minority being in favor of restricting the truth as a justification to cases of publications upon the conduct of persons
in theirpublic capacity, or of candidates for office: Id. 220-222.
The convention, having ordered the proposed constitution to be
published for the consideration of the citizens, adjourned on
February 26 to the following August.
On reconvening, the instrument was again taken up for discussion, section by section, and the minority made strenuous
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further efforts to restrict the justification to cases of public officers, at one time failing only by the close vote of 30 to 32.
During the progress of the debate, an amendment, offered by
Mr. Lewis, and seconded by Mr. McKean, that "the jury shall
have the same right to determine the law and the fact, under
the direction of the Court, as in other cases," was carried, and
the clause finally adopted in the form, "in prosecutions for the
publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers or men in a public capacity, or where the matter published
is necessary or proper for public information, the truth thereof
may be given in evidence; and in all indictments for libels, the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts
under the directions of the Court, as in other cases :" Id. 274279. It is impossible to read these various steps in the formulation of our fundamental law without seeing that there was
never at any time the intention to make or to consider juries as
in any sense judges of the law. No such possible construction
seems to have been apprehended until suggested by McKean;
and the practically unanimous vote, on his motion, to add
"under the direction of the Court, as in other cases," shows
the feeling of the convention on the subject. McKean was at
that time one of the foremost personages of the Commonwealth:
perhaps its best trained lawyer. He had studied in the Temple, and was familiar with the details of the legal controversy
between Buller and Mansfield, on the one side, and Erskine,
on the other, before Fox took it up as a matter of politics; and
he knew, as Lewis and Wilson and Ross and Sitgreaves and
Addison and Findley and other leaders of the convention
knew, that the contest was not for any control by"the jury as
judges of the law. Even Junius hardly ventured to put his
denunciations of Mansfield in that form, but for the right of
applying the law to the facts and pronouncing the result by
general verdict. And such was the understanding of the convention as it was of Parliament two years later, and such the
natural meaning of the language on which they finally settled
to express their purpose. It puts beyond question the right to
return a general verdict; nothing more. To cut the sentence
in two, and say the jury are "to determine the law," is not
only to prevent the meaning, but to nullify the other command,
that they are to be determined "under the direction of the
What they are to determine is "the law and the
Court."
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facts as in other cases;" that is, the law as given to them by
the Court, and the facts as shown by the evidence. They are
bound to take the law from the Court; but so taking it, they
have the right to apply it to the facts as they may find them to
be proved, and to announce the result of the whole by a general
verdict of guilty or not guilty. Any other construction would
be totally at variance with the fundamental principles of our
system of jurisprudence, and with our settled and uncontested
practice. It has never been claimed that the jury are to determine what evidence is admissible, or what witness competent;
yet if they are judges of the law, they should decide these often
most important law points in a case. So as to the sufficiency
of an indictment. Again, the jury have a right to return a
special verdict, even in a criminal case: Dowman's Case, 9
Coke Rep. 126, 2 Inst. 425; Hargrave's note to Coke Litt.,
155 b. It is admitted that they must decide the facts; and if
they are judges of the law, then it is their duty to decide it,
and they cannot transfer that duty to the Court. The prisoner
might demand his right that they should exercise their full
functions. But all the authorities are to the contrary; and if
the finding of the facts can be separated from the conclusion of
law, the latter will be decided by the Judges by their own
views. "When a jury find the matter. committed to their
charge at large, and further conclude against law, the verdict
is good and the conclusion ill :" Heydon's Case, 4 Coke, 42 b.
"The office of twelve men is no other than to inquire of matters of fact, and not to adjudge what the law is, for that is the
office of the Court, and not of the jury; and if they find the
matter of fact at large, and further say that thereupon the law
is so, where, in truth, the law is not so, the judges shall adjudge according to the matter of fact, and not according to the
conclusion of the jury:" Townsend's Case, Plowden 114 b.
And see 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 302; i Chitty, Criminal
Law 645.
Much misunderstanding has, in my judgment, been caused
in this State by the case of Kane v. Comnmonwealth, 89 Pa. 522.
In that case the point was to put the Court below, that "the
jury are the judges of the law and the fact," and all that this
Court decided was that the point should have been affirmed.
The language of Chief Justice Sharswood was, however, less
guarded than was usual with that eminent jurist, and follow-
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ing Slale v. Crofeaw, 23 Vt. 14, he dismisses the perfectly clear
and substantial distinction between power and right with a
brevity that is scarcely consistent with the weight of the
subject. "The distinction between power and right," he says,
"whatever may be its value in ethics, in law is very shadowy
and unsubstantial. He who has legal power to do anything
has the legal right. No Court should give a binding instruction to a jury which they are powerless to enforce by granting
a new trial if it should be disregarded." It is somewhat remarkable that the Chief Justice should assume, as is so commonly done by counsel, that the jury will construe the law
more favorably for the prisoner than the Court would. It is
only such a construction, too favorable to the prisoner, that
the Court is powerless to remedy by a new trial, and that lack
of power arises, not because the jury's legal power is the same
as a legal right, but because, for reasons of general policy, one
verdict of accquittal is a final and irreversable termination of
the case. If legal power means legal right, then a jury has a
right to acquit any prisoner without regard to either law or
evidence, for their power to do so is beyond question, and they
cannot be held to any accountability, though they follow the
maxim of lynch law, that the murdered man deserved to die
anyhow, and therefore his murderer should not be punished,
even he no longer seeks refuge behind the thin veil of transitory insanity that began when the shot was fired, and ended
when it had killed its man. Whether the distinction between
power and right be shadowy and unsubstantial in practice or
not, it is clear and vital, and I must repudiate such a confusion
of logical as well as moral ideas. A jury may disregard the
evidence; but no Judge has ever said it had the legal right to do
so; and if the disregard is of the weight of the evidence favorable to the prisoner, the Court sets aside the verdict without
hesitation; and even this Court, though it does not pass upon
the weight of evidence, does examine its sufficiency, and may
on that ground reverse without a new venire. Com. v. Fleming,
r3o Pa. 163; CoMrn. v. Anarr, 135 Pa. 47; Com. v. Railroad Co.,
135 Pa. 256; Cont. v. Brown, 138 Pa. 452; Coin. v. Ruddle,
142 Pa. 144, are a few recent instances of the exercise of this
power.
So the jury may disregard the law favorable to the prisoner.
As was suggested by the learned Judge at the trial of the case
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in hand, the jury had the legal power to find murder of the
first degree without regard to the element of premeditation;
but no Judge would contend that they had the legal right to
do so; and if the evidence of premeditation was below the legal
standard, determined by the Court as a matter of law, not only
would the trial Court set aside the verdict, but this Court
would be bound to review the evidence and determine whether
the legal elements of murder of the first degree existed in the
case. Such powers and such duties in the Courts are absolutely
inconsistent with the right of the jury to be in one sense
judges of the law.
This is not new doctrine, but the long-established law of the
State. Alexander Addison was one of the stanchest asserters
of the rights of juries in the Constitutional Convention, and
was one of the minority of three who voted against McKean's
amendment to insert the words "under the direction of the
Court, as in other cases;" but when three years later he presided in the Oyer and Term Terminer of Washington County,
he laid down the law in these precise and forcible terms:
"Whether the facts are so or so, .it
lies with you to determine,
according as you believe the testimony, supposing them so or
so; whether they amount to murder or manslaughter is a
question of law for the Court to determine. You may find.
according as you believe or disbelieve the facts, and comparing
the facts with the rules of law, that the prisoner is guilty or not
guilty (of murder) or guilty of manslaughter; or you may find
the facts specially, without drawing any conclusion of guilt or
innocence, leaving it to the Court to pronounce the construction which the law puts on the facts found; but you cannot.
but at the peril of violation of duty, believing the facts, say
that they are not what the law declares them to be, for this
would be taking upon you to make the law, which is the
province of the Legislature; or to construe the law, which is
the province of the Court:" Penna. v. Bell, Add. 16o. And
in Com. v. Sherry, an indictment for murder, growing out of
the riots of I8 44,removed by certiorari from the Quarter Sessions
of Philadelphia, and tried in the Nisi Prius in April, 1845,
Justice Rogers charged the jury as follows: "You are, it is
true, judges in a criminal case, in one sense, of both law and
fact; for your verdict, as in civil cases, must pass on law and
fact together. If you acquit, you interpose a final bar to a
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second prosecution. . . . The popular impression is that this
power . . . arises from a right on the jury's part to decide the

law as well as the facts according to their own sense of right.
But it arises from no such thing. It rests upon a fundamental
principle of the common law, that no man can twice be put in
jeopardy for the same offence. .

..

It is important for you to

keep this distinction in mind, remembering that, while you
have the physical power by an acquittal to discharge a defendant from further prosecution, you have no moral power to do
so against the law laid down by the Court. The sanctity of
your conclusions in case of an acquittal arises not from any
inherent dominion on your part over the law, but from the
principle that no man shall be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offence-a principle that attaches equal sanctity to an
acquittal produced by a blunder of the clerk, or an error
of the Attorney-General .....
.You
will see from these
considerations the great importance of the preservation, in
criminal as well as in civil cases, of the maxim, that the
law belongs to the Court, and the facts to the jury. My
duty is, therefore, to charge you, that while you will in this
case form your own judgment of the facts, you will receive
the law as it is given to you by the Court: " Wharton on

Homicide, Append. 72r. To the same effect, though less explicitly developed, are the rulings of Serjeant, J., of this Court,
in Com. v. Va Sickle, Brightly, 73; and by Gibson, C. J., in
Com. v. Harman, 4 Pa. St. 269. And this also seems to have
been the later and better considered opinion of Judge Baldwin,
whose charge in U. S. v. Wfilson, Bald. 99, is commonly
quoted as authority on the other side. See his charge in
U,. S. v. Sive, Bald. 512. I do not understand that the case
of Kane v. Com. was intended to overrule or conflict with these
decisions; and notwithstanding the latitude of the language of
the opinion, the real point decided did not go beyond the
affirmation of the right to an instruction that "the jury are
the judges of the law and the facts."
In the present case, it
will be observed that the instruction asked was that the jury
are I"judges of the law as well as of the facts;" that is, of each,
not merely of the joint result of both. For myself, I think
even the formula, that the jury are judges of the law and
the facts, objectionable as tending to convey to the jury a
wrong idea. The language of the Constitution is, that the
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jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts
under the direction of the Court. This is the accurate formula,
and it means only that they have the right to determine the
joint result of the law and the facts by a general verdict. This
is the form which ought to be used when instruction on the
subject is asked, and it ought to be accompanied by explicit
instruction that the jury are not judges of the law, in all cases
where there is any apparent danger that the jury will arrogate
to themselves such function.
My conclusions on the general subject, therefore, are:
(i) The jury were never judges of the law in any case,
civil or criminal, except incidentally, as involved in the mixed
determination of law and facts by a general verdict.
(2) Even if it could be conceded that they may have been
so in primitive times, their right certainly ceased after the introduction of bills of exception and the granting of new trials,
and admittedly has not existed in civil cases for centuries.
(3) That there was not originally, nor is now, any distinction in this respect between civil and criminal cases, the true
rule as to both being that "the immediate and direct right of
deciding upon questions of law is intrusted to the Judges; in a
jury it is only incidental :" Hargrave's note to Coke upon Littleton, 155 b. The idea of a difference in the rights and functions of juries in civil and criminal cases as to the determination of the law arose from a misconception of the controversy
over the right to give a general verdict, and was an error for
which there is no respectable English authority, and which the
best American authorities have overwhelmingly disapproved.
That even if the jury had originally had such right in criminal
cases, it was an anomaly, belonging to the period when jurors
were selected from the vicinage, because of their knowledge of
the case, and, like its conjener, has changed and disappeared
because totally inconsistent with the functions of courts and
juries as now understood, with sound reason and with common
sense. And such change, if change it be, has the sanction of
the constitutional provision, that the jury shall determine,
"under the direction of the Court," the legislative provisions
for bills of exception, the review of the evidence in cases of
murder, etc., etc., and of the long-settled and incontestable
power of Courts to decide questions of evidence, to set aside
verdicts, and grant -new trials without limit, except when con-
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trolled by the ancient maxim of the common law, embodied in
our constitutional Declaration of Rights, that no man shall be
twice vexed for the same offence.
This whole subject is discussed with exhaustive learning and
ability in State v. Croteaw, 23 Vt. 14. The opinion of the
Court by Hall, J., is the only serious attempt that I have been
able to fiud to support the dogma for which it is now mainly
responsible; and, with great respect for that eminent
jurist, it appears to me that this whole argument is based
on the confusion of the right to determine the law with the
right to render a general verdict. A careful examination
of all the authorities cited by him (and they include everything which the most learned and diligent research could discover) shows that they only go so far as to sustain the right
of the jury not to be judges of or to determine the law, but
only to apply it through a general verdict.
The dissenting opinion of Bennett, J., in the same case, displays equal learning and sounder reasoning. It is a storehouse
of information on the subject, and has anticipated everything
that can be said upon it. A masterly analysis and review, by
Chief Justice Shaw, will also be found in Commonwealth v.
Anthes, 5 Gray 185. There are less elaborate but equally
clear and forcible statements of the argument by Story, J., in
U. S. v. Battiste, 2 Sumner 240; by B. R. Curtis, J., in U. S.
v. Morris, I Curt. C. C. 23, 49; by Gilchrist, J., in Pierce v.
State, 13 N. H. 536; and by Shaw, C. J., in Commonwealth v.
Porter, io Metc., Mass. 263. See also Montgomery v. State,
II Ohio 427; fontee v. Commonwealth., 3 J. J. Marshall 149;
Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 151 (but see Armstrong v. State,
4 Blackf. 247); Pierson v. Stale, 12 Ala. 153; Hardy v. State,
7 Mo. 607; Nels v. State, 2 Tex. 280; Brown v. Commonwealth, io So. East Rep. 745 (Court of App. of Va. 189o); a
very able and compendious statement of the controversy in
England, while still raging, before the passage of the Libel
Act, by Mr. Hargrave, in his note to Coke Litt. 155 b; an
article by C. J. Wade, of Montana, in 3 Criminal Law Mag.
484; and one by the late Dr. Francis Wharton, in 5 So. Law
Rev. (N. S.) 352 (reprinted in 36 Leg. Intell. 405, and 1 Crim.
Law Mag. 47), 7 Dane's Abridg. 381-3; 2 Boston Law
Rep. 187; 15 Id. I; and 13 LAw REGISTER (N. S.) 355.
As already stated, there is not a single respectable English
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authority for the doctrine in question ; and against the foregoing solid phalanx of the best American judicial and professional
opinions I have not been able to find a single well-considered
case, except Stale v. Croteaw, which, as already seen, was by a
divided Court. Under these circumstances, whether the doctrine be of much practical importance or not, I cannot help
thinking it a matter of regret that any vestige of it should be
left in Pennsylvania.
The subject which is so ably discussed by Mr. Justice Mitchell in
the foregoing opinion is one which
has commanded the attention of
the brightest minds both of Bench
and Bar. During the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries this question
was, perhaps, considered of greater
importance than it is at the present
day; for when the doctrine that
juries had a right to decide both the
law and the facts was first claimed
the people of England were engaged in that mighty struggle
between the tyranny of the king
and his judges on the one hand,
and the liberty of the masses on the
other.
The Judiciary have endeavored,
in many cases, to compel juries to
take the law as given to them from
the Bench, but in many other cases
the Courts have decided that juries
were not bound to be governed by
the instructions of the presiding
Judge.
The following is a brief summary of the decisions in some of
the cases in which the question has
arisen :
In Lilburne's Case, 2 Hargrave's
St. Tr. 79 (1649), the jury acquitted
a prisoner charged with treason,
and declared that they were the
judges of the law as well as of the
facts, although the Court had told
them otherwise. This case seems
to have been an entering wedge,
and in the reign of King Charles

II the doctrine was firmly established.
About 1667, Chiefjustice Kelynge
fined the members of a grand
jury because they would not return
a bill of indictment for murder.
He told them that the defendant
having taken the life of the deceased, it was their duty to find a true
bill, as it was a matter of law for
the Court whether it was murder
or self-defence. He also fined several petit juries for refusing to act
under his instructions, and for returning a verdict of manslaughter
when he told them it was murder.
These acts. of the Chief Justice
having come to the notice of Parliament, a committee of that body
reported that the proceedings were
"innovations in the trial of men
for their lives and liberties, and
that he had used an arbitrary and
illegal power which was of dangerous consequence to the lives and
liberties of the people of England," and also recommended the
punishment of the Judge: 6 St.
Tr., 992-10r9 (1670).
In 1670, William Penn and another were tried in London for a
breach of the peace. The alleged
unlawful act consisted in the assembling ofabout two hundred and fifty
persons to hear an address by Penn.
The defendants contended that
there had been no unlawful assembly, and read from Lord Coke to
the jury in support of their posi-
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in vogue at that time, and Ahich
tion. The Court charged strongly
is mentioned in a note to Stle v.
against the prisoners; but the jury,
in spite of the Judge, returned a
Croteaw, supra, is as follows:
verdict of acquittal. The Court
For twelve lonest nien
then fined the jurors andcommitted
I-ave decided the cause,
Who arejudges alike
them to jail. One of these named
Of the facts and the laws.
Bushell obtained a writ of habeas
co;5us, and the question of This right is explicitly admitted by
whether the jury had the right to
Coke : Coke Litt., 228, a.
decide the case "contrary to the
Blackstone, in his Commentaries,
direction of the Court in matter of
page 361, says: "The jury have
law" was argued before the Court
an unquestionable right to deterof King's Bench. The prisoner was
mine upon all the circumstances,
discharged, in an opinion delivered
and to find a general verdict, if they
by Chief Justice Vaughn: Bush- think so proper to hazard a breach
eli's Case, Vaughn, 135-158 (1670).
of their oaths." Quoting from Sir
In fact, the power of granting
Matthew Hale he says: "If the
new trials, even in civil cases, Judge's opinion must rule the verwas not recognized until after the dict, the trial by jury would be
middle of the seventeenth century;
useless."
for previous to that time the jury
In the United States, one of the
first cases was the trial of Henfield
were alone responsible for any error
of law in their general verdict,
for illegal privateering, reported in
and had the right to determine the
Wharton's St. Tr., 88 (1793), and in
law according to their own judg- which the Judge told the jury that
nent: State v. Croteaw, 23 Vt., 2r.
they were the judges of the law
The attainder of Sir Algernon
as well as of the facts.
Sidney in 1683 was reversed by
On the trial of Fries for treason
Parliament, and the doctrine laid
in i8oo, Judge Chase, of the United
down by the trial Judge, that the
States Supreme Court, said, in
jury must abide by the law as given
charging the jury, that "it was the
to them by the Court, was denied
duty of the Court, in that and all
Another impor- criminal cases, to state to the jury
and reprobated.
tant case soon after this, was the
their opinion of the law arising on
case of the Seven Bishops, 12 St. the facts, but that the jury were to
Tr., 183 (i6SS), where the jury ex- decide, in that and all .criminal
ercised the right of deciding the
cases, both the law and the facts
law for themselves.
on their consideration of the whole
In King v. Dean of St. Asoph,
case: State v. Croteaw, supfra.
On the impeachment of Judge
3 Term Rep., 429 (1784), it was
held that the whole question of the
Chase it was testified by Mr. Tighlcriminality of a publication was
man, of Pennsylvania, that "the
usual practice in the Courts, in
withdrawn from the jury. This
decision was opposed by many of
which lie had -been, was for the
the Judges; and finally, in 1792, the Court to permit the counsel on
both sides to argue the law to the
Fox Libel Act was passed, which
affirmed the right of juries in
jury at length," and, when they
prosecutions for libel to give genhad finished, the Judge would
eral verdicts. A ballad which was
charge what, in his opinion, was
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the law, but informed the jury
that they were "the judges of the
law and the fact :" Chase's Trial,
27 (I804).
On the trial of Smith and Ogden,
236 (i8o6), the Judge charged the
jury that "it was a well-settled
rule of law that the right appertained to them to decide the law as
well as the facts, in criminal prosecutions."
In Peopile v. Croswell, 3 Johnson's Cases, 337 (N. Y., I8O4), the
Court were equally divided as to
whether the intention of the defendant in publishing the libel
should have gone to the jury.
This case caused much discussion
throughout the State, and gave
rise to the Act of Assembly of i8o5,
which provided that" the jury who
shall try the same [the cases of
libel] shall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under
the direction of the Court, in like
manner as in other criminal cases."
See opinion of Judge Hall, in State
v. Croteaw, supra.
In Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass., 25
(18oS), it was decided that "the
issue involved both law and fact,
and the jury must decide the law
and the fact."
The maxim "ad questionemfacti
non respondent judices, ad questionen legis non respondent juratores" has reference merely to
questions of law and fact that stand
on the record, and does not apply
to legal questions arising incidentally out of an issue of fact.
" Where law and fact are blended,
as they must be in the general
issue, it is impossible to decide the
one without the other, and, therefore, in all such cases, the juries,
if they decide at all, must, ex
necessitate, decide the law as well
as the fact:" State v. Allen, I MIcCord, 525 (1822).
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In U. S. v. Wilson, i Baldwin.
99 (I83O), 'Mr. Justice Baldwin
charged the jury as follows: "We
have thus stated to you the law of
this case under the solemn duties
and obligations imposed on us, under the clear conviction that in
doing so we have presented to you.
the true test by which you will
apply the evidence to the case; but
you will distinctly understand that
you are the judges both of the law
and the fact in a criminal case, and
are not bound by the opinion of
the Court; you may judge for yourselves; and if you should feel it
your duty to differ from us, you
must find your verdict accordingly.
At the same time it is our duty to
say that it is in perfect accordance
with the spirit of our legal institutions that Courts shall decide questions of law, and the juries of fact;
the nature of the tribunal naturally
leads to this division of duties, and
it is better for the sake of public
justice that it should be so : when
the law is settled by a Court there
is more certainty than when done
by a jury; it will be better known
and more respected in public
opinion. But if you are prepared
to say that the law is different
from what you have heard from
us, you are in the exercise of a
constitutional right to do so."
Com. v. Knapp, io Pickering, 447
(I83O), and Com. v. Kneeland, 20
Ibid., 222 (1838), hold that in criminal cases the jury are judges of the
law so far as it is involved in the
general question of guilty or not
guilty.
In Armstrong v. State, 4 Blackford, 247 (837), the defendant was
indicted for keeping a gaming
house, and his counsel asked the
lower Court to instruct the jury that
they were judges of the law as
well as of the facts; but the Court
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refused so to charge. On appeal
it was held that the learned Judge
erred in not giving the instruction
asked for by defendant.
This case overruled Townsend v.
State, 2 Blackford, xr (1828), in
which it was held that the jury were
bound to receive the law as given
to them by the Judge. See, also,
State v. Snow, I8 Maine, 246 (1841);
Doss v. Com., I Grattan, 559

(IS4).
-

In Stale v. Croleaw, 23 Vt., 21
(1849), which is a leading case in
support of this right of juries,
Judge Hall says: "The history
of English criminal jurisprudence
furnishes abundant evidence . . .
that the power of juries to determine the law as well as the facts
in criminal trials was essential to
the protection of innocence and
the preservation of liberty." This
case is approved of in State v.
Banron, 37 Vt., 57 (j864).
Stale v. Tully, 23 La. An., 677
(1871), holds that the jury are the
judges of the law and the facts;
and although they ought to receive
the law as laid down by the Court,
they are under no compulsion to
do so. State v. Saliba, IS Ibid.,
35 (1866), is followed.
In .ifuzllinix v. People, 76 Ill.,
21r (1875), the Supreme Court decided that a jury could disregard
the directions of the Judge if they
think on their oaths that they are
better judges themselves. This
case follows Schnier v. People, 23
11., I7 (1859). and Falk v. Peoble,
42 Ill., 331 (i866).
Some cases, although they admit
the power of the jury to decide the
law, by a general verdict, nevertheless deny that they have a moral right so to do. The following
cases answer or assume to answer
his propositiofi.

In People v. Croswell. 3 Johnson's Cases, 368 N. Y. (i8o4), Chancellor Kent said: "While the power
of the jury is admitted, it is denied
that they can rightfully or lawfully
exercise it without compromising their consciences, and that
they are bound in all cases to
receive the law from the Court.
The law must, however, have intended in granting this power to a
jury to grant them a lawful and
rightful power, or it would have
provided a remedy against the
undue exercise of it.
The true
criterion of a legal power is its capacity to produce a definite effect
liable neither to censure nor review.
and the verdict of not guilty, in a
criminal case, is, in every respect,
absolutely final."
In State v. Jones, 5 Ala., 666
(1843), the Supreme Court said:
"The power of the jury to judge
both of law and fact results necessarily from the very constitution of
that body and from their right to
find a general verdict for the prisoner which the Court cannot disturb. . . . This right of the
jury is doubtless one of ii'estimable value, especially in those
cases where it may be supposed
the government has an interest
in the conviction of the criminal.
.Whether they will receive
the law from the Court must be
left to their own discretion under
the sanction of the oath they have
taken."
Judge Hall said, in State v. Croteaw, supra, that "te
power of
juries to decide the law as well as
the fact involved in the issue of not
guilty, and without legal responsibility to any other tribunal for their
decision, is universally conceded.
In my opinion such power is
equivalent to right. . . . That
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there is a distinction in morals between power and right is undoubt. but this distincedly true ; .
tion has no application to questions
of political power." When a power is given to the different officers or
departments of a government, the
fact of such assignment of power
implies that it may be lawfully and
rightfully exercised. As to the objection, that the jury can abuse the
power, it is to be answered that
any person in a position of responsibility may do so. They are
sworn to do their duty, and it is to
be presumed that they will regard
their oaths. "I conclude, then,
that when political power is conferred on a tribunal without restriction or control, it may be lawfully
exerted."
In State v. M!cDonnell, 32 Vt.,
532 (x86o), the Supreme Court said
that if juries are made to feel that
they have the power and the right
to decide the law in a criminal case,
over the head of the Judge, if they
care to take the responsibility, they
will not do so in practice, except in
extrneme cases. Judges are liable
to err, and even Courts of last resort, so that "the modification of
the common-sense instincts of the
more unsophisticated" is required.
"This, in civil cases, is well enough
left to the interference of the legislature; but in criminal cases, affecting life or character or liberty, such
a resort would come too late."
In a note to State v. Buckley, 13
Am. LAw REG. (N.S.), 358 (1874), it
is said : " For since it is clear the
jury have the right to rejudge any
question of law involved in a criminal cause, and to settle it in their
own way, without regard to tLe
directions of the Court, and thus
acquit the accused by a general
verdict, upon the mere fancy that
the law is not wise or useful, . . .
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and such verdict will be final, . . .
there seems no great use in having
much controversy upon the question whether this is the legitimate
right of the jury, or only a power
which juries sometimes assert, in
vindication of what they may,
rather indefinitely, call justice."
Kane v. Com., 89 Pa., 522 (1879),
is a leading case in favor of this
right ofjuries, and is justly entitled
to much weight on account of the
learning and ability of Mr. Chief
Justice Sharswood, who delivered
the opinion of the Court. He says:
"The distinction between power
and right,whatever may be its value
in ethics, in law is very shadowy
and unsubstantial. He who has
legal power to do anything has the
legal right."
The other side of this interesting
question is so fully discussed by
the learned Justice that it will be
only necessary to give a very short
review of a few of the cases.
In Townsend's Case, Plowden, I I
(r554), the jury undertook to decide
a point of law, and the finding was
reversed because it was said that "it
is not the duty of jurors to judge
what the law is."
The Court said, in King v. Oneby, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1485 (1727),
that it is "properly the province of
the Court to determine what acts
afford proof of malice."
In Kiing v. Poole Cases, Temp.
Hardwicke, 28 (177o), it is said
"that the point of law is not to be
determinedby juries; juries have a
power by law to determine matters
of fact only, and it is of the greatest consequence to the law of
England and to the subject
that these powers of the Judge and
jury are kept distinct; that the
Judge determine the law, and the
jury the fact."
Chief Justice Best said in Levi v.
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01ilne, 4 Bingham, i99 (1827): "I
mean, however, to protest against
juries, even in criminal cases, becoming judges of the law; the act
only says the jury may find a general verdict." -The act referred to
is Fox's Libel Act.
The Constitution of Kentucky
empowered the jury in libel cases
to be judges of the law "under the
direction of the Court."
Held,
that the jury have the legal right
to disregard the instructions of the
Judge, but not the moral right to

their duty to receive the same from
the Court, and to conform their
judgment to such instructions.
They are as much bound by their,
oaths to do this as they are bound
to decide all questions of fact according to the evidence.
Nrels v. State, 2 Texas, 280 (1846)
says: "The jury are the exclusive
judges of the facts; . . . for
their law it is their duty to look to
the Court."
In fierson v. State, 12 Ala., 149
(1847), it is said that the Court is the
do so: lontee v. Corn., 3 J. J. proper person to explain the law to
Marshall, 149 (1830).
the jury, and that the latter have no
It was decided in U. S. Battisle, 2 control over it, except in so far as
Sumner, 243 (1835), that in criminal
they can return a general verdict.
Judge Curtis,. in U. S. v. Jlorris,
cases the jury are no more judges
i Curtis, 23 (i85i), holds, in a verof the law than in a civil case
tried upon the general issue. In
exhaustive opinion, that, under
each they have the physical power
the Constitution and laws of the
to disregard the law as laid down
United States, the jury are not the
by the Court, but they have not the judges of the law, in a criminal
moral right to decide the law, accase. The jury are to be told what
cording to their own notions.
the law is, and they are bound to
The Supreme Court said-in Hardy consider that they have been told
v. State, 7 Mo., 607 (1S42): "It is truly. If
the contention, that
difficult to conceive how the Crim- juries are the judges of the law, is
inal Court could consistently tell
true, we have a body chosen withthe jury they were the judges of the
out reference to their qualifications
law, after having undertaken to tell
to decide questions of law, not
them what was the law of the case."
allowed to give reasons for their
It is the duty of the Judge to indecisions, and yet possessing comstruct thej ury as to the law, and the plete power to determine that an
act passed by the legislative deduty of the jury to respect their inpartment is invalid.' "The practistructions and to convict or acquit
the prisoner according to the law cal consequences of such a state of
as delivered to them by the Court things are too serious to be lightly
encountered."
in the same manner as they receive
In New York the case of Carbenthe evidence from the witnesses.
ter v. People,8 Barbour S. C. R., 6xo
Piercev. State,13 N.H., 536 (1843),
andthe dissenting opinion in State (i85o),decided, that "the idea,which
has become somewhat current in
v. Croleaw,sufra,are leading cases
some places, that in criminal cases
to the same effect.
the jury are the judges of the law
In Com. v. Porter, io Metcalf, 263
as well as the facts, is erroneous,
(I845), the Supreme Court said that
not being founded upon principle
the Judge should give instructions
to the jury on all questions of law
or supported by authority."
which arise in the case, and it is
In Corn. v. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185
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(1855), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the legislature
could not confer on the jury, in
criminal trials, the rightful power
to determine questions of law, involved in the issue, contrary to the
instructions of the Court.
Even at common law the jury
in criminal cases were bound to take
the law as given to them by the
Court: Williams v. State, IO Ind.,
503 (1858).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Nicholson v. Cont., 96 Pa.,
5o3 (88o), affirmed the charge of
the lower Court, in which the jury
were told that the only safe course
for them to pursue was to receive
their instructions from the Judge,
for the reason that they are not
supposed to be learned in the law.
In Georgia the juries are judges
of the law as well as of the facts,
in criminal cases, but they should
accept the law as laid down by the
Judge : Huntv. State, 7 S. E. Rep.,
142 (1888).
A statute of Massachusetts provided that "the jury shall try, according to established form and
principles of law, all criminal
causes committed to them, and,
after having received the instructions of the Court, shall decide in
their discretion both the fact and
the law involved in the issue."
Held, not to authorize the jury to
decide questions of law contrary to
the instructions of the Court: Corn.
v. Mazynski, 21 N. E. Rep., 228
(1889).
In Virginia Brown v. Com., ioS.
R. Rep. 745 (189o), holds that "al-

though authorities may be found
in support of the doctrine contended for by the prisoner (for at one
time it was a popular one) it is not
founded in principle." The fact
that the jury may bcquit contrary
to the direction of the Court and
their verdict will be final is not
based on their right to determine
the law of the case for themselves,
but on the principle of law that no
man can be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offence.
Drake v. Slate, 20 At. Rep., N.
J-, 747 (I89O), gives a discussion on
the province of Court and jury in
libel cases.
The late Dr. Wharton gives a
very thorough review of the whole
subject in his book on Criminal
Law, Vol. III, Sec. 3263, and in an
article published in I Crim. Law
11ag., 47. He says that the better
opinion now is that juries are not
judges of the law in criminal cases.
Another article to the same effect
by Chief Justice Wade, of Montana,
is to be found in 3 Crim.Law Mag.,
484.
Judge Cooley, in his work on
Constitutional
Limitations, 396
(Edition of j89o), says: "It isthe
duty of the jury to receive and
follow the law as delivered to them
by the Court; and such is the clear
weight of authority;" and in his
edition of Story on the Constitution it is laid down that juries are
not judges of the law in criminal
cases in the Federal Courts : lO64
n., 1780 n.
C. PERCY WILLCOX.

